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1079 
Stewarding Species: How the Endangered 
Species Act Must Improve 
Justin Berchiolli* 
This Note situates a roundtable discussion hosted by the University of California, Irvine 
School of Law Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources and the 
Environmental Policy Innovation Center into scholarly discourse. The Note identifies the 
three most important areas that the Endangered Species Act must improve to maximize 
conservation outcomes: promoting recovery, protecting habitat, and managing change. Within 
these areas, this Note highlights the importance of offering clearer guidance to the implementing 
Agencies, providing additional flexibility for working with private stakeholders, allowing for 
change and risk adaptation, increasing ecosystem-management implementation, and  
enabling proactivity. 
 
 
  
 
* Justin Berchiolli is a graduate of the University of California, Irvine School of Law, Class of 2019. 
The author would like to thank Alejandro Camacho and Melissa Kelly for their sage feedback, Alice 
Lee for her steadfast wit, and Fredrick Berchiolli for his provident counsel. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since its ambitious advent some four decades ago, the Endangered Species 
Act (hereinafter “ESA” or “Act”)1 has developed substantially.2 Controversy and 
disagreement have accompanied this growth, and many proposals to change the Act 
have surfaced over the years.3 While the majority of proposals focus on making the 
Act more efficient to benefit the regulated community, a sizeable countercurrent of 
scholarship addresses the ecological shortcomings of the Act and proposes 
improvements to maximize conservation outcomes.4 This Note focuses on three 
areas likely to provide the most impactful modifications to the Act: (1) promoting 
recovery; (2) protecting habitat; and (3) managing change. Building upon a survey 
of ESA-amelioration scholarship, this Note integrates proposals addressing the 
major shortcomings in these three areas with the reactions of experts who attended 
a roundtable discussion hosted jointly by the University of California, Irvine School 
 
1. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2018).  
2. See generally J.B. Ruhl, Endangered Species Act Innovations in the Post-Babbittonian  
Era–Are There Any?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 419 (2004) (tracing ESA development across  
different administrations). 
3.  See, e.g., Attacks on the Endangered Species Act, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY  
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/esa_attacks/table [https://
perma.cc/8RAV-MKJN]. 
4. See, e.g., infra notes 5–160.  
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of Law Center for Land, Environment, and Natural Resources and the 
Environmental Policy Innovation Center.  
I. PROMOTING RECOVERY 
A. No Statutory Duty to Recover Species  
The ESA aims “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which 
endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, [and] to 
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened 
species.”5 By codifying the preservation of species and ecosystems, the Act 
implicitly acknowledges extinction prevention as a central goal. And by further 
requiring the development and implementation of recovery plans, the Act also 
adopts the recovery of these species as a central goal.6 Despite mandating the 
survival of species and requiring recovery plan development, the ESA imposes no 
duty to implement recovery plans or to ensure the recovery of listed species.7 The 
absence of a statutory mandate requiring recovery plan implementation—or even 
just recovery—robs the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (hereinafter “Services” or “Agencies”) of temporal accountability to such 
an extent that it forestalls species recovery, perhaps indefinitely.8  
Many scholars agree that recovery ought to be required and view requiring a 
recovery plan as an important step to achieving recovery.9 Similarly, imposing 
procedural deadlines could easily resolve the practice of incomplete and latent 
recovery plan designation and implementation.10 Requiring both recovery and 
recovery planning provides a meaningful backdrop for designing and overseeing 
recovery goals.11 The Services already provide biannual recovery reports to 
 
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018). 
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (2018). 
7. Patrick A. Parenteau, Rearranging the Deck Chairs: Endangered Species Act Reforms in an Era 
of Mass Extinction, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 227, 264 (1998); Eric Helmy, Teeth for 
a Paper Tiger: Redressing the Deficiencies of the Recovery Provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 30 
ENVTL. L. 843, 853–54 (2000) (portraying various scholars criticizing lack of this duty as generally 
rendering recovery plans unenforceable and removing the important safety net of citizen suit litigation).  
8. See University of California, Irvine School of Law Center for Land, Environment, and Natural 
Resources and the Environmental Policy Innovation Center Roundtable Workshop 3, 21 (Apr. 11, 
2019) [hereinafter UCI Law ESA Roundtable] (transcript available from the UC Irvine School of Law) 
(on file with author and UC Irvine School of Law) (identifying as drivers of Agency inaction the inability 
of stakeholders to challenge either adequacy of recovery process or failure to impose recovery plans); 
see also Helmy, supra note 7, at 846. 
9. See, e.g., UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 21–23. The textual solution to require 
recovery is to amend 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) by striking the phrase “unless [the Secretary] finds that such 
a plan will not promote the conservation of the species.” See also Helmy, supra note 7, at 854 (offering 
administrative mechanics for implementing this change). 
10. See UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 21–22; see also Helmy, supra note 7, at 845. 
11. See, e.g., Robert P. Davison et al., Wildlife Society, Practical Solutions to Improve the 
Effectiveness of the Endangered Species Act for Wildlife Conservation, WILDLIFE SOC’Y TECHNICAL  
REV. 05-1, Dec. 2005, at 10 (suggesting Office of Management and Budget hold agencies accountable, 
through Government Performance and Results Act procedures, for contributing to meaningful 
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Congress, but they are insufficient because they do not allow for measurable 
benchmarks.12 A simple improvement would be to require these reports to outline 
changes in species threats and demographic status and to provide an assessment of 
the current status of the species’ population relative to recovery.13  
Requiring recovery may seem simple, but the Act has operated for decades 
without a recovery mandate. As a result, the Services have made “survival” the de 
facto implementation standard for two important potential recovery mechanisms, 
Section 7 jeopardy findings and Section 10(a) incidental take permits.14 For 
example, the Section 7(a)(2) jeopardy prohibition currently bans actions “that 
reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the 
likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in the wild.”15 Thus, 
unless an action threatens the survival of a listed species, it may legally reduce its 
prospect of recovery.16 This language draws a distinction between survival and 
recovery that lacks scientific merit and undermines recovery efforts by rendering 
them unenforceable.17 To make this management standard more productive for 
recovering species, some commentators suggest disaggregating the concepts of 
survival and recovery, implicating nothing more than a simple textual 
modification.18 By changing “both” to “or,” the statute would prohibit actions 
affecting survival or recovery, integrating recovery considerations into jeopardy 
determinations, and extending the relevance of recovery across the statute by 
requiring the Services to more consistently consider recovery goals.  
Even if policymakers were to adopt regulations promoting and overseeing 
species recovery, increasing the regulatory burden on the Services without equally 
increasing their funding may not translate to Agency-driven recovery progress.19 
However, the imposition of additional statutory obligations creates more 
 
progress towards recovery of listed species); see also UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 25 
(identifying median age of recovery plans as twenty-two years, implying necessity of revision mechanism 
such as requirement that prior to delisting species, Services must first review and update recovery plan 
and base delisting determination on updated recovery plan). 
12. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 21. 
13. Id.  
14. 16  U.S.C.  §§  1536(a)(2),  1539(a)  (2018);  Parenteau,  supra  note  7,  at  307.  This  Note 
only cursorily considers incidental take permits, which allow for the “take” of endangered or threatened 
species in exchange for the implementation of Habitat Conservation Plans (HCPs). 
15. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2019) (emphasis added).  
16. Parenteau, supra note 7, at 270. 
17. Id. (demonstrating difficulty of enforcing recovery plans given that courts require showing 
that action actually threatens species extinction).  
18. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2019) (“[T]hat reasonably would be expected, directly or indirectly, to 
reduce appreciably the likelihood of . . . the survival [or] recovery of a listed species in the wild.”) 
(emphasis added); see Parenteau, supra note 7, at 270. 
19. See, e.g., Parenteau, supra note 7, at 264 (arguing that Services’ recovery-plan capabilities are 
“[u]nderstaffed, underfunded, and besieged on all sides,” resulting in a limited ability to move the 
recovery process forward); see also Robert L. Fischman, Predictions and Prescriptions for the Endangered 
Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 451, 472 (2004) (examining cost projections of recovering listed species versus 
resource availability). More broadly, the lack of funding and resources limits the potential of any 
statutory changes explored in this Note.  
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enforceable duties subjecting Agencies to citizen suit enforcement oversight. This 
expanded safety net may enable the public to help drive recovery. Moreover, 
requiring Agencies to achieve more with less may also encourage Agencies to seek 
partnerships with stakeholders, such as a system of mitigation banking or 
transferable mitigation credits.20 Some commentators advocate directing the 
Services to contract with private stakeholders to recover species when doing so is 
cost effective.21 These types of partnerships would do more than maximize 
resources, by using the guarantees and enforcement mechanisms of contract law to 
extend the jurisdiction of the Services into private land where the majority of legal 
protections for endangered species could not otherwise follow.22  
To further operationalize recovery, some commentators suggest implementing 
a net positive recovery standard to guide Agency action, encouraging Agencies not 
to approve projects unless they benefit recovery.23 Such a standard, coupled with an 
actual recovery mandate, will result in the Services allowing fewer government 
actions to impact species.24 Changing internal Agency policy promotes recovery 
without spending additional money.  
B. Unclear Definition of Recovery 
Clearly defined recovery goals will facilitate recovering species. Currently, 
once a species is listed into the ESA framework under Section 3, its road to recovery 
is unclear, and thus, insecure.25 The ESA defines the concept of “recovery” 
implicitly and unhelpfully as when a species is no longer “likely to become an 
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant 
portion of its range.”26 The lack of a clearly articulated and attainable goal for listed 
species makes it harder to delineate, track, and enforce recovery progress.27 In 
 
20. See UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 8–9, 26 (advocating making recovery 
planning accessible and transparent to enable stakeholder partnerships by using accessible interactive 
databases tracking recovery status); see also id. at 15 (identifying need to incentivize Services to act); see 
infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text for a discussion on banking.  
21. Id. at 28 (limiting this suggestion to species benefitting from proactive restoration such as 
invasive species control). 
22. See, e.g., Randy T. Simmons, Fixing the Endangered Species Act, 3 INDEP. REV., no. 4, Spring 
1999, at 511, 513. As a practical matter, the Services cannot enforce legal protections on private land 
because they lack the ability to monitor or access these lands. 
23. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 8–9.  
24. Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6 (examining how a recovery mandate will impact how 
Agencies advise other agencies, make jeopardy determinations, and react to incidental take permits). 
25. Parenteau,  supra  note  7,  at  264  (identifying  lack  of  clear  recovery  plan  standards  and 
uncertainty regarding enforcement).  
26. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (20) (2018); KEYSTONE CTR., THE KEYSTONE WORKING GROUP 
ON ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT HABITAT ISSUES 31 (2006); Mark W. Schwartz, The Performance of 
the Endangered Species Act, 39 ANN. REV. ECOLOGY EVOLUTION & SYSTEMATICS 279, 283 (2008) 
(“Recovery plans tend to underemphasize monitoring threats to species and biotic interactions relative 
to monitoring population trends.”). 
27. See Daniel M. Evans et al., Species Recovery in the United States: Increasing the Effectiveness of 
the Endangered Species Act, ISSUES IN ECOLOGY, Winter 2016, at 21 (advocating for recovery oversight 
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particular, scholars have identified poorly defined recovery as creating a disconnect 
between the five-factor listing threat analysis employed under Section 328 and how 
the Services decide to assess recovery criteria.29  
Scholars have provided several methods of clarifying the meaning of recovery. 
One way of clearly articulating recovery goals is to define recovery as the reverse of 
the five-factor listing analysis.30 Another method is to adopt a two-element recovery 
rule whereby a species is recovered so long as: 
(1) the population [has] increased or, at least, stabilized at a point that it is 
both sufficiently large and dispersed to reduce the risk from a stochastic 
event to an acceptable level; and (2) there [is] sufficient security against 
either the recurrence of the threats that prompted the listing, or of new 
risks, so that the species is unlikely to slip back into a threatened status.31  
A third proposal identifies the International Union for Conservation of 
Nature and Natural Resources Red List status as an appropriate guide for  
assessing recovery.32 
Setting objective recovery criteria for species may be impractical from a cost 
perspective,33 but the prospect of recovery nevertheless increases with the adoption 
of clearer and more measurable metrics. Defining recovery also allows for 
adjusting34 and assessing recovery goals. Clearer and more objective standards also 
incentivize the Services by holding them accountable.35 Moreover, quantifying 
recovery goals generates information36 useful to achieving recovery by providing 
 
process to include numerical measurements, at specific times and places, with clearly stated levels of 
statistical confidence); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 283.  
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2018) (“The Secretary shall . . . determine whether any species is an 
endangered species or a threatened species because of any of the following factors: (A) the present or 
threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for 
commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the 
inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its 
continued existence.”). 
29. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 21; see also id. at 23 (warning against 
overextending discretion to agencies to decide how and when to meet recovery because of lacking  
judiciary oversight).  
30. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 23. 
31. KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 26, at 32; see also Schwartz, supra note 26, at 294 (arguing that 
recovery assessments should be based on population viability and extinction risk as opposed to 
population size). See infra Section II.B for more on stochasticity and risk.  
32. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 24; see Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature, 
THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED SPECIES, https://www.iucnredlist.org [https://perma.cc/
GVL2-9Z3F] ( last visited Feb. 22, 2020). 
33. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 23.  
34. See infra Section III.C on adaptive management. 
35. See, e.g., UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 23–24. 
36. Holly Doremus, Adaptive Management, the Endangered Species Act, and the Institutional 
Challenges of “New Age” Environmental Protection, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 50, 70–72 (2001).  
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the Services with a broader foundation for making choices and  
prioritizing resources.37  
C. Disparate Resource Allocation Among Listed Species 
The lack of a blanket recovery mandate and the general resource shortage 
combine to result in a disproportionate allocation of recovery resources to relatively 
few species, substantially diminishing the potential to recover most other species.38 
Agency discretion, litigation, and the sheer number of listed species requiring 
recovery plans exacerbate the unequal and potentially ecologically-inefficient 
distribution of resources.39 As a result, many species lack recovery plans and the 
Services have no effective guidance for addressing this backlog.40 
Some scholars suggest prioritizing recovering species that most need 
meaningful recovery progress or that most benefit their ecosystem.41 Adopting a 
uniform and explicit system for prioritizing recovery actions based on need would 
enable the Services to more broadly allocate its funding to benefit diverse and 
historically neglected species.42 Under such an approach, experts, nonprofits, and 
Agencies may collaborate to prioritize listing and funding allocations, designate 
habitat, and provide strategies for maximizing funding impact.43  
On the other hand, some scholars recommend expanding the scope of the 
ESA to adopt an ecosystem-wide, as opposed to a species-specific, approach.44 
Adopting an ecosystem-wide approach would justify spending more money on 
species that benefit their ecosystems but lack charisma and thus receive less funding. 
Recovering these utilitarian species would benefit other listed species by improving 
the health of the underlying shared system. Using an ecosystem-based prioritization 
 
37. See UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 30 (identifying lack of data as undercutting 
Services’ potential to recover species).  
38.  Schwartz, supra note 26, at 283; Davison et al., supra note 11, at 9; Evans et al., supra note 
27, at 11. 
39. Parenteau, supra note 7, at 264.  
40. Id. But see Schwartz, supra note 26, at 286–87 (arguing that although Congress charged the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to develop a priority ranking system based on threat and utility of funding 
in achieving recovery, Services have not followed it). 
41. See Evans et al., supra note 27, at 11, 25. 
42. Id. at 11; see, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 26, at 282 (pointing out that the ESA largely fails to 
protect plants and invertebrates). 
43. W. LANDOWNERS ALL., SPEAKING FROM EXPERIENCE: LANDOWNERS & THE 
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 20–21 (2017) (promoting adoption of peer-reviewed recovery outlines at 
the time of listing decisions and imposition of specified recovery timeframes to streamline recovery 
process and harbor goodwill among private landowners); Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6, 10 
(promoting adoption of biologically based priority scheme developed by Agencies through public notice 
and comment); Evans et al., supra note 27, at 13. 
44. See, e.g., John Charles Kunich, Preserving the Womb of the Unknown Species with Hotspots 
Legislation, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1193 (2001); Parenteau, supra note 7, at 279; Evans et al., supra note 
27, at 25. But see UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 3–4 (warning of design scope incongruency, 
lack of resources, and potential for overlooking localized species).  
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model may also help maximize recovery dollars by promoting ecosystem health, 
which may help concurrently recover multiple species.45  
A prioritization plan must nevertheless contend with public desire or litigation 
diverting attention to particular species.46 The difficulty of forecasting recovery 
costs compounds this political reality, further highlighting why Agencies apply most 
of their funding to relatively few species.47 Accordingly, adopting a prioritization 
scheme is worthwhile, but its impact largely depends on political factors outside the 
scope of this Note.  
D. Ecologically Ineffective Populations 
Statutory recovery mandates fail to adequately protect ecologically effective 
populations of species, whose absence decreases biodiversity by reducing critical 
interactions among species.48 Many listed species subsist in isolated populations 
with relatively small population sizes and relatively insecure survival prospects.49 As 
habitat fragmentation intensifies, metapopulation and patch dynamics become 
increasingly important, compounding the Act’s failure to protect  
ecologically-meaningful and resilient populations.50 To remedy this, commentators 
have suggested explicitly defining and adopting the distinct recovery goal of  
ecologically-effective populations.51 Enabling these populations requires assessing 
the functional role of a species within its ecosystem and maximizing the genetic 
diversity, resilience, and geographic distribution necessary to preserve  
this function.52  
The ESA already incorporates into its goal the protection of single species and 
broad ecosystems.53 But scholars heavily debate the feasibility and effectiveness of 
 
45. See UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 8 (arguing that recovering species in areas 
that do not have other listed species overlapping geographically provides biggest return  
on investments). 
46.  See, e.g., Candee Wilde, Evaluating the Endangered Species Act: Trends in Mega-Petitions, 
Judicial Review, and Budget Constraints Reveal a Costly Dilemma for Species Conservation, 25  
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 318–23 (2014). 
47. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 21. 
48. Kunich, supra note 44, at 1199–1220 (arguing for prioritizing conservation of species most 
important to their ecosystems and lamenting that “[t]here is no formal system for assigning higher 
priority to indicator or keystone species, whether in listing, designation of critical habitat, or 
development of recovery plans.”); Evans et al., supra note 27, at 23 (defining ecologically effective 
population as the population size below which the species is so rare that it cannot perform one or more 
ecosystem functions, such as predation or seed dispersal). 
49. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 23.  
50. Daniel J. Rohlf, Six Biological Reasons Why the Endangered Species Act Doesn’t Work—and 
What to Do About It, 5 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 274, 277 (1991). 
51. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 23. 
52. Id. at 11, 23; Rohlf, supra note 50, at 277 (suggesting, as a means of operationalizing this 
goal, translocation and artificial breeding exchanges between isolated species populations to help 
preserve genetic fitness and general long-term survivability of species). 
53. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018). 
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using the ESA to protect ecosystems, as opposed to individual species,54 and we 
have insufficiently tested its mechanisms.55 Nevertheless, guidance that identifies 
and operationalizes the link between species and ecosystems is useful insofar as it 
promotes recovery of ecologically extinct species populations to ecologically 
meaningful populations.56 Moreover, adopting changes focused on ecological 
dynamics may maximize resource expenditure by providing a mutually-beneficial 
framework wherein adopting measures that promote the health of species within 
their ecosystems conversely promotes the health of various species within  
the ecosystem.57  
Applying an ecosystem framework is also useful because it institutionalizes the 
science of ecosystem ecology in the practice of species management, providing a 
framework that may be scaled with increased funding.58 Even if increased funding 
does not arrive, using ecosystem-based principles for species-specific management 
also maximizes the resilience of ecological communities in the face of system-wide 
environmental challenges that undermine efforts to protect any one species.59  
II. PROTECTING HABITAT  
Habitat is the cornerstone of species survival, let alone recovery.60 Conferring 
legal protections upon a species is pointless without adequately protecting the 
habitat upon which it depends.61 The ESA protects habitat primarily by designating 
 
54. Kunich, supra note 44, at 1193–95 (arguing inadequacy of ESA as legislative strategy for 
addressing global biodiversity problem because it focuses on individual imperiled domestic species as 
opposed to network of species concentrated in planet’s most significant pockets of life); see Parenteau, 
supra note 7, at 279 (identifying as examples of how ecosystem management approach could be 
effective, the Natural Communities Conservation Plan (NCCP) in Southern California and the Balcones 
Canyonlands Plan outside Austin, Texas). Contra Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and 
Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 974–78 (1997) (arguing that an ecosystem approach is 
too vague a concept to serve as useful model for species protection, and that it is better to use a 
surrogate species approach, with specific, enforceable standards); UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 
8, at 3 (noting as a limitation of adopting ecosystem-based framework that forty-seven percent of listed 
species are localized within the county level and do not fit larger ecosystem management frameworks); 
cf. Holly Doremus, The Endangered Species Act: Static Law Meets Dynamic World, 32  
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 175, 232 (2010) (examining shortcoming of ecosystem approach in protecting 
genetic subdivisions); Schwartz, supra note 26, at 283 (identifying multispecies plans in Florida and 
Hawaii as promising but poorly executed). 
55. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 25. 
56. See, e.g., Eric V. Hull, Protecting Endangered Species in an Era of Climate Change: The Need 
for a Smarter Land Use Ethic, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV., 579, 602–04 (2015); Evans et al., supra note 27. 
57. See, e.g., David S. Wilcove et al., Rebuilding the Ark: Toward a More Effective Endangered 
Species Act for Private Land     (Dec. 5, 1996),     https://omnilearn.net/esacourse/pdfs/
Rebuilding_the_Ark.pdf [https://perma.cc/HE2R-P8B2]. But see UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra 
note 8, at 26 (arguing that some ecological tradeoffs benefit systems while harming species and  
vice versa). 
58. See Evans et al., supra note 27, at 21–26. 
59. For more discussion on addressing climate change in the ESA, see infra Section III. 
60. See, e.g., Rohlf, supra note 50, at 278. 
61. Id.  
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critical habitat for species when they are listed.62 The Act also protects habitat 
quality through permitting and consulting.63 Despite the importance of habitat to 
the survival and recovery of species, the Act fails to adequately protect it.64  
A. Lack of Critical Habitat 
The Section 3 statutory cost-benefit critical habitat designation consideration 
represents a major impediment to the Act’s ability to protect critical habitat.65 
Agencies may exclude areas of critical habitat based on economic grounds,66 a lack 
of resources,67 a lack of information,68 or a high political cost.69  
Removing or restricting the cost-benefit gatekeeping mechanism is the most 
straightforward way to increase critical habitat designation.70 In addition to 
removing a significant hurdle to designation, making this change would allow the 
Services to avoid complex and expensive economic-impact analyses, leaving the 
Agencies with more resources to assess and designate more critical habitat.71 
However, because the Services lack sufficient resources to designate critical habitat 
for the majority of listed species,72 removing the cost-benefit hurdle fails to address 
the root of the problem. There would still be a large backlog of listed species without 
critical habitat. Moreover, allowing Agencies to look past cost-benefit does not 
mean that the tradeoffs and their political costs cease to exist. Making the critical 
 
62. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3) (2018). 
63. Schwartz, supra note 26, at 284 (identifying as indirect benefits of critical habitat, 
streamlining Section 7 consultations, incentivizing habitat-conscious land management, and providing 
guidelines for Habitat Conservation Plans). 
64.  See, e.g., Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the 
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279, 282–83 (1998); UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra 
note 8, at 11, 16–21.  
65. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 278 (“[B]y broadly interpreting Congress’s exception that critical 
habitat need not be established if not ‘prudent’ or determinable, the Services avoided designating critical 
habitat concurrent with listings.”). 
66. See id. (arguing that enabling cost-benefit analysis results in agencies avoiding political 
conflict by listing less critical habitat, an irreconcilable decision given the necessity of habitat  
to recovery). 
67. See Schwartz, supra note 26, at 284 (quantifying lack of progress in designating critical habitat 
over thirty-two years); Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6 (arguing that Services lack resources to comply 
with ESA critical habitat designation requirements).  
68. See Davison et al., supra note 11, at 5 (arguing that, “[a]t the time of listing, the specific areas 
occupied by a species, and the physical and biological features that define habitats ‘essential to the 
conservation’ of the species, generally are not well known”). 
69. See, e.g., UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 16 (arguing that critical habitat 
designation inflames private property owners, resulting in the Services avoiding its designation and 
instead indirectly protecting habitat with restrictive jeopardy determinations). 
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (2018) (“The Secretary shall designate critical habitat . . . after taking 
into consideration [its] economic impact . . . .”).  
71. See Davison et al., supra note 11, at 5 (exploring the expenses associated with critical habitat 
cost benefit analysis). 
72. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.  
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habitat designation process less controversial would thus make it more effective.73 
In fact, Agencies view designating critical habitat as one of the most contentious 
things that they do and avoid it when possible.74  
1. Shifting Critical Habitat Designation to the Recovery Planning Phase 
To reduce controversy and otherwise promote more effective habitat 
planning, many commentators suggest designating critical habitat after listing, 
during the recovery planning phase.75 The recovery planning process generates 
significant amounts of information absent from the species listing stage, resulting 
in decreased planning costs, more time for public preparation, and a more 
established framework for public partnership.76 In turn, these effects result in more 
transparency, less conflict, and decreased litigation costs.77 Tying critical habitat and 
recovery more closely together would even allow for both processes to be leveraged 
against each other, for instance, by requiring the designation of critical habitat by a 
certain date if the Services fail to complete recovery planning within that  
time period.78  
Considering the twin goals of critical habitat preservation and recovery 
simultaneously also provides a more comprehensive framework for more effective 
landscape-level conservation.79 This broader framework allows for more 
proactivity,80 facilitates private partnerships,81 and increases the flexibility of 
species-specific goals.82 
 
73. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64  
FLA. L. REV. 141, 186, 190 (2012) (suggesting that the Services avoid political pressure by ignoring 
statutory directives to avoid political pressure).  
74. Id. at 186–87, 190. 
75. KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 26, at 6; Sam Kalen, Landscape Shifting Paradigm for the 
Endangered Species Act: An Integrated Critical Habitat Recovery Program, 55 NAT. RES. J. 47, 92 (2014) 
(identifying informational benefits of engaging in recovery planning first, or concurrently to, critical 
habitat designations); Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6 (advising caution “when there is an urgent 
eminent threat to significant amount of occupied habitat that would warrant designation at the time of 
listing”). But see UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 17 (warning that if critical habitat is not 
initially designated, the opportunity to protect requisite geographic area for recovery may be lost).  
76. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 17–18; see infra Section II.A.2. 
77. KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 26, at 34. 
78. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 16. 
79.  See, e.g., Kalen, supra note 75, at 100–02 (outlining such an integrated approach to include 
specific management objectives, plans, or policies based on recovery plans, and suggesting concurrently 
drafting National Environmental Policy Act documents outlining management objectives of  
critical habitat).  
80. Fischman, supra note 19, at 479 (arguing that area-wide planning is one example of 
preventive healthcare system for biodiversity that will take pressure off post-listing Agency action by 
already having habitat accounted for and protected). 
81. Davison et al., supra note 11, at 12 (arguing that landscape focus better integrates landowner 
and government partnerships by informing them of major conservation needs in the landscape in 
question, allowing for flexible contributions). 
82. Fischman, supra note 19, at 479 (demonstrating how landscape-based planning enables 
greater flexibility in trade-offs that agencies make with regulated entities, such as preserving habitat on 
one side of watershed versus the other). But cf. Frederic H. Wagner, Whatever Happened to the National 
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2. Prioritization and Partnership 
Even with the benefits of adjusting the timing of critical habitat designation, 
the Services must still negotiate a substantial backlog of species without critical 
habitat designations.83 Some commentators suggest prioritizing designation based 
on need.84 Other commentators suggest prioritizing designations by excluding 
habitat protected by partnership initiatives like Habitat Conservation Plans.85 This 
prioritization approach acknowledges different tiers of critical habitat whereby the 
lower tier(s) forego statutory protection in exchange for a partnership structure with 
incentives for private stakeholders to invest in conservation and steward habitat.86 
Integrating the Section 7 consultation process with offsite mitigation and a habitat 
mitigation banking program would allow landowners to create and market habitat 
or ecosystem protection values.87  
Excluding from critical habitat designations habitats that may otherwise 
already be protected by partnership initiatives allows Agencies to focus on 
protecting landscapes that lack any regulatory oversight.88 Furthermore, offering 
choices in regulatory regimes reduces the political cost of habitat by emphasizing 
 
Biological Survey, 49 BIOSCIENCE 219, 219 (1999) (pointing out that effective landscape-based 
management requires significant information production to understand the location, vigor, trends, and 
needs of species). 
83.  Schwartz, supra note 26, at 284; Davison et al., supra note 11, at 3. 
84. Davison et al., supra note 11 (arguing that such a prioritization scheme could be achieved 
administratively by amending the ESA to require Agencies to establish, through notice and comment, 
detailed policy and procedural guidance on how to identify, quantify, and map critical habitat, assess 
economic and other impacts of designation, and balance benefits of designating any specific area in 
comparison to benefits of not designating).  
85. Id. at 6; Owen, supra note 73, at 196–97; see also Parenteau, supra note 7, at 309; UCI Law 
ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 16 (encouraging adoption of no net-loss standard for critical habitat 
management that would provide additional guidance and safeguards for relying on HCPs). But  
cf. Alejandro E. Camacho, Can Regulation Evolve? Lessons from a Study in Maladaptive Management, 55 
UCLA L. REV 293, 324–25, 336 (2007) (identifying shortcomings in HCP design process including lack 
of focus on structural issues or allowance for adaptive management); id. at 320–22, 328, 352 (identifying 
shortcomings in HCP review process including lack of a program-wide framework for enabling  
multi-party negotiations or adaptive management, and lack of enforcement). 
86. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 17; see also id. at 18–20 (proposing system 
whereby if landowner voluntarily creates HCP with plan for species recovery increase, critical habitat is 
not designated, allowing stakeholders a choice to meet unwritten critical habitat requirements with 
customized HCP approach or let Agencies do so with traditional approach); id. at 18 (suggesting an 
alternative whereby Services administer a land-trust system that enables private investment by offering 
benefits, like tax deductions, akin to those present in conservation easements).  
87. J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform of The Endangered 
Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 367, 405 (“The advantage of the banking approach is that it divorces 
decisions about the size of a habitat conservation area from the specific project-by-project impact 
evaluation required by the permitting program, and therefore larger and more contiguous preserves 
than might otherwise be possible are allowed.”). But cf. Owen, supra note 73, at 192–93 (acknowledging 
the critique of mitigation that the good quality of existing land is traded for the potential to restore 
already-degraded land, but nevertheless arguing that without offsite mitigation, many small 
environmental harms will simply escape regulatory coverage).  
88. Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6.  
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partnership, increasing transparency, and tailoring regulatory solutions.89 By making 
critical habitat less controversial and more flexible, this framework empowers the 
Services to choose between traditional critical habitat designation or  
partnership-based alternatives.  
B. Deficient Habitat Degradation Standard  
The overall lack of designated critical habitat is a major shortcoming in how 
the Act protects critical habitat.90 But critical habitat management is equally 
impactful.91 An unclear and overly permissive Section 7 adverse modification 
standard enables the degradation of existing critical habitat.92 Despite the statutory 
mandate clearly outlawing adverse modification of habitat, the Services have 
complicated and undermined the textually rigid standard with ad hoc reasoning 
through individual consulting and permitting decisions.93 In practice, the Services 
ignore the incremental nature of harm to species and write small-scale habitat 
degradation out of the ESA’s protections.94  
An explicit prohibition on adverse modification of critical habitat is necessary 
to protect species from the aggregate impact of many small harms that do not 
independently threaten recovery or survival and are consequently overlooked by the 
 
89. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 73, at 190; UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 16.  
90.  See, e.g., Davison et al., supra note 11, at 5. 
91. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018) (“Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any  
action . . . is not likely to . . . result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such  
species . . . .”).  
92. Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S. Departments 
of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 277, 297 (1993); Owen, supra note 73, at 146; Rohlf, supra 
note 52, at 278. 
93. Owen, supra note 73, at 146 (arguing that Services have given adverse modification 
prohibition hardly any independent significance, instead treating prohibition as redundant with  
other measures). 
94. Id.  
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Section 7 jeopardy standard and the Section 9 take standard.95 The Agencies may 
even overlook the adverse modification standard as being redundant.96  
Commentators offer several solutions. One direct solution is to make the 
adverse modification standard more stringent so that even if a government action 
reduces a species’ chances for recovery without imperiling its ability to survive, it is 
still outlawed.97 A similar and complementary change would strengthen the 
definition of “take” to explicitly outlaw any adverse impact on primary constituent 
elements of critical habitat.98Adopting these changes as well as those listed above in 
Section I would provide critical habitat with a much more effective role in 
promoting the survival and recovery of endangered species. Because habitat is 
requisite for recovery, the more importance recovery is given, the more protection 
habitat will receive.99  
Increasing the rigidity of the adverse modification standard would benefit 
from clarifying the line between impermissible adverse modification and 
permissible habitat degradation. The Services will always allow some degree of 
habitat degradation.100 To this end, perhaps critical habitat designations ought to be 
restricted in size to more precisely reflect the minimum, but absolutely necessary, 
confines of survival and recovery.101 Integrating critical habitat designation into 
recovery planning should help clarify the utility of critical habitat by tying recovery 
 
95. 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2018); Owen, supra note 73, at 161 (arguing that critical habitat’s adverse 
modification standard is critical to protecting endangered species because many environmental changes 
occur based on aggregate of many small harms, e.g., watershed degradation caused by small surface 
level changes and other stressors). “Indeed, because of this unique role and the pervasive challenges of 
incremental environmental degradation, this prohibition appears to be one of the most powerful and 
important levers in all of environmental law.” Id.; see also id. at 173, 180–81 (further cataloguing utility 
of codified, albeit largely ignored, critical habitat adverse modification prohibition to: (1) increase 
likelihood that consulted agencies would engage in informal consultation prior to proceeding with 
projects; (2) spur Services to think more carefully about species’ habitat needs and help them develop 
more protective conditions; (3) provide Services with more leverage to negotiate habitat conditions; (4) 
help landowners and action agencies avoid conflict with species’ needs; (5) provide basis for regulated 
entities’ beliefs that critical habitat designations increase regulatory stringency, thereby deterring some 
activities that might otherwise harm species; (6) affect regulatory approaches of other environmental 
agencies by providing signal that some habitats are particularly important; (7) provide information that 
helps Services implement other statutory requirements; (8) lead to more thorough and rigorous analysis 
of habitat needs; and (9) help write recovery plans, negotiate HCPs, and target spending to conservation 
and recovery projects); Houck, supra note 94, at 310 (demonstrating critical habitat’s utility in contrast 
to jeopardy standard in context of judicial enforcement due to its relative perceived rigidity contrasted 
with flexibly interpreted jeopardy standard). 
96. Owen, supra note 73, at 166 (“[T]he agencies have treated the class of actions that adversely 
modifies habitat without also causing jeopardy as a null set.”). 
97. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 278; see supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
98. UCI  Law  ESA  Roundtable,  supra  note  8,  at  16  (suggesting  allowing  citizen  suit 
enforcement of this proposal). 
99. For example, Section 7 jeopardy findings would have to be more closely reconciled with 
the existence of quality habitat. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
100. Owen, supra note 73, at 194. 
101. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 16 (suggesting that Services do not faithfully 
uphold adverse modification standard because they cannot glean which parts of designated critical 
habitat actually contain the physical or biological features critical to habitat).  
First to Printer_Berchiolli (Do Not Delete) 3/17/2020  7:33 AM 
2020] STEWARDING SPECIES 1093 
plans to specific habitat usage.102 Creating tiers of critical habitat will also help by 
providing a clear distinction between the highest tier of critical habitat containing 
untouchable critical habitat, and lower tiers containing intermediate zones of 
important, albeit not “critical,” habitat.103  
C. Inadequate Consideration of Ecosystems 
As mentioned above in Section I.D, the Act is rooted in a framework that 
somewhat ignores the ecological interactions of species that are constituent 
representations of the ecosystems within which they function.104 The rationale cited 
in Section I.D applies with equal vigor to the context of protecting critical habitat 
by adopting large scale ecosystem-management principles.105 Several commentators 
suggest using surrogate species as a proxy for identifying the habitat and 
management needs of larger groups of species that embody closely-related 
ecological requirements, biological traits, and responses to environmental change.106 
Applying this broader framework provides ecological,107 financial, and political 
benefits.108 As explored above in Section I.D, habitat quality and species resilience 
are interconnected, and applying ecological principles that seek to preserve and 
maximize the wellbeing of ecological communities will also benefit the species 
within that system.109 Moreover, inherent in recognizing the importance of 
preserving ecosystems is the acknowledgement of the large scale of habitat that 
warrants some degree of protection, even if not under the critical habitat 
framework. Tiering critical habitat with buffer zones that allow for, and thus 
incentivize, private partnership,110 will expand the regulatory safety net, even if the 
standard of protection differs across the habitat. And again, the potential for 
 
102. See id. at 16–18. 
103. See id. 
104. Kunich, supra note 44; Evans et al., supra note 27, at 23.  
105. See, e.g., Parenteau, supra note 7, at 249, 306. 
106. See Rohlf, supra note 50, at 275; Evans et al., supra note 27, at 25; Simmons, supra note 22, 
at 513. 
107. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 25 (explaining that implementing surrogate species framework 
allows for cross-management of species that are interdependent, such as predator and prey, and for 
taking advantage of umbrella species dynamics with broad ecological requirements or geographic ranges 
including multiple species of concern). 
108. Id. (arguing that management centered on surrogate species reduces costs and facilitates 
decision-making within policy- and management-relevant timeframes by allowing conservation 
planning to proceed without full knowledge of every impacted species or ecosystem element). 
109. See supra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
110. See, e.g., KEYSTONE CTR., supra note 26, at 19–20, 22 (advocating for expansion of 
incentive-based partnerships between private landowners and Agencies such as Conservation Reserve 
Program, Environmental Quality Incentives Program, Wildlife Habitat Incentives Program, Healthy 
Forests Reserve Program, and Forest Stewardship Program); Davison et al., supra note 11, at 6 
(advocating for expansion of Landowner Incentive Program); Evans et al., supra note 27, at 16 
(advocating for development of partnerships with landowners to manage recovery of  
conservation-reliant species). Other commentators suggest going even further by shifting entirely from 
the penalty-based approach under Section 9 to the positive incentive approach to harness the voluntary 
compliance of private landowners. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 22, at 530–33. 
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insufficient resources does not detract from the fact that operationalizing ecosystem 
management provides the Services with a useful framework.111 
III. MANAGING CHANGE 
As time passes, the challenges to preventing extinction and promoting 
recovery increase.112 To be sure, the Act never fully considered these challenges at 
its inception,113 but habitat fragmentation and climate change increasingly 
complicate the reality of biodiversity conservation.114 Though many commentators 
agree that the ESA should not attempt to mitigate climate change,115 the Act should 
nevertheless strive to become more effective at addressing the increasingly changing 
and increasingly challenging conservation context exacerbated by climate change.  
A. Underemphasizing Dynamism 
The ESA conceptualizes its goal as maintaining the constancy of species within 
ecosystems that are, however, dynamic.116 Goals of static, enduring species 
populations are undoubtedly problematic in light of naturally occurring population 
fluctuations, naturally occurring evolution, and naturally occurring extinction.117 
This unrealistic goal of constancy undermines how the Act addresses listing, habitat, 
and recovery.118  
The listing framework may account for the reality of evolutionary dynamism 
exacerbated by climate change by adopting new guidelines for the identification of 
species and subspecies that will enable a broader acceptance of adaptive divergence 
in genetics, behavior, and ecology.119 The Act’s treatment of habitat and recovery 
would benefit from adopting more realistic risk forecasts (see Sections II.B and C), 
acknowledging range shift and behavioral changes, and adopting an understanding 
of climate habitat “niches” that will change significantly, or even disappear, over 
time.120 More openly acknowledging that an increasingly dynamic world produces 
significant ecological changes will justify increasing risk buffers (see Section II.B), 
 
111. See supra Section I.D. 
112. See generally Doremus, supra note 54 (examining the transition from traditional goals of 
ecological stasis to embracing the reality of dynamism). 
113. Id. at 183–84. 
114. See generally Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural 
Resource Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. REG. 171 (2010) (discussing moving species into new 
habitats as an insurance strategy against climate change).  
115. UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 25–26. 
116. Doremus, supra note 54, at 175; Simmons, supra note 22, at 515 (“Instead of constancy and 
stability, disturbance and change have been the norm throughout the evolutionary history of  
the earth.”). 
117. Doremus, supra note 54, at 182; see also Simmons, supra note 22, at 516. 
118. See Doremus, supra note 54, at 233. 
119. Id. at 215, 233 (advocating for consulting with contemporary taxonomists to reimagine 
legal taxonomic frameworks based on acceptance of rapid evolutionary change spurned by  
climate change). 
120. Id. at 226. 
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making recovery planning more adaptive (see Section II.C), and more fully 
embracing the principles of proactivity and precaution.  
However, imparting a greater acceptance of dynamism into the Act is not 
without its risks. In particular, acknowledging impending natural extinction creates 
the challenge of distinguishing between unacceptable anthropogenic extinction and 
acceptable natural, unavoidable extinction.121 By allowing some species to continue 
their natural trajectory towards extinction, Agencies may accidently, or even 
intentionally, misidentify species as having naturally impending extinctions to justify 
not allocating resources to them, not drafting recovery plans, or not designating 
critical habitat. But on balance, acknowledging dynamism is necessary because it 
creates a framework to prepare for risk.  
B. Flawed Risk Projections 
The ESA’s conception of risk fails to adequately acknowledge climate change’s 
impending challenges.122 In particular, the Section 7 consultation and biological 
opinion process and the Section 3 listing process fail to rigorously incorporate the 
risks posed by climate change.123 A general solution is to treat uncertainty (especially 
human-caused environmental stochasticity) in a probabilistic manner as opposed to 
ignoring or discounting it.124 The implications of managing this uncertainty manifest 
themselves differently in different sections of the Act.  
Section 7 allows for the consideration of climate change but does not explicitly 
require it, which extends a counterproductive amount of deference to Agencies who 
should not have the discretion to ignore impending risks.125 Some commentators 
have suggested addressing this by integrating guidelines for mandatory climate 
change-related risk mitigation into Section 7 consultations and the biological 
opinion process.126 This would create a more rigid consultation process by equating 
a certain extent of reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts with unavoidable, 
and thus unacceptable, jeopardy.127 However, these changes may increase the 
 
121. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lesley Brown, Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act Versus 
Ecosystem Management Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and Recommendations for Reform, 
12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 151, 163 (1997). 
122. See, e.g., Rohlf, supra note 50, at 279 (arguing that Services tend to overestimate species’ 
chances of survival by discounting or ignoring natural as well as human-related stochastic threats to 
species’ environments, creating paradigm whereby listed species often receive less protection than is 
necessary to ensure their continued existence). 
123. James Ming Chen, ƂƱƪƴƯƽƱƯƲ: Protecting Biodiversity Against the Effects of Climate Change 
Through the Endangered Species Act, 47 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 19–20 (2015); Rohlf, supra note 50, 
at 276; see also Camacho, supra note 85, at 303 (arguing that HCPs fail to consider more than just  
habitat-based threats to endangered species, overlooking invasive species management and  
climatic change).  
124. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 279. 
125. Chen, supra note 123, at 19. 
126. Id.  
127. See id. (arguing that a less permissive consultation process will more faithfully serve 
statutory goal of preventing jeopardy); see also Evans et al., supra note 27, at 23 (proposing a specific 
framework for vulnerability assessments taking into account (1) species’ exposure to climate change 
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political cost of consultations, which increases the duration of consultations while 
creating a bigger sink for Agency resources.128 Given that some commentators have 
already identified Agencies opting for informal consultations to avoid  
resource-intensive formal consultations,129 Agencies may eschew additional formal 
requirements like added climate change-risk considerations in favor of  
informal consultations. 
Finally, the Section 3 listing standard lacks explicit biological criteria and 
inadequately defines “foreseeable future,”130 leaving species-security determinations 
to the discretion of the Services, resulting in a different biological meaning for the 
terms “endangered” and “threatened.”131 Commentators suggest amending Section 
3 to accurately reflect risk by setting specific standards regarding timing and 
likelihood of risk, codifying the difference between more secure species and those 
facing extinction.132  
Currently, the Services focus on resiliency, redundancy, and representation.133 
Instead, some commentators advocate focusing on more scientifically sound 
metrics like rarity (relative abundance), threats (and their scope, severity, and 
immediacy), and trends (in population numbers, area of occupancy, and range 
size).134 Specifically, Agencies ought to holistically evaluate listing and delisting by 
considering population decline and loss, habitat loss, and range decline.135 Adopting 
an objective standard of species security, despite inherent scientific uncertainty, 
would permit the Services to make and have more clearly articulated policy 
choices.136 Moreover, transitioning to a more scientifically sound metric will also 
help the Services give adequate consideration to species sub-populations, which are 
necessary for long term survival but overlooked by current listing protocol.137 
 
based on past and future projected change; (2) species’ biological sensitivity (using long term 
physiological or ecological studies documenting species’ responses to climate change); and (3) potential 
that species and their habitat has to adapt to climate change). 
128. Jacob W. Malcolm & Ya-Wei Li, Data Contradict Common Perceptions About a Controversial 
Provision of the US Endangered Species Act, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15844, 15848 (2015). 
129. Id. 
130. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(B) (2018) (“[T]he Secretary shall give consideration to species 
which have been . . . identified as in danger of extinction, or likely to become so within the  
foreseeable future . . . .”). 
131. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 276 (arguing that without objective standard, Services make these 
determinations on case-by-case basis with reference to qualitative factors such as species’ historic 
abundance and threats to existence); see also Chen, supra note 123, at 14–15. 
132. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 276. 
133. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 6.  
134. Id.  
135. Id. at 22. 
136. Rohlf, supra note 50, at 276. 
137. Kunich, supra note 44, at 1201 (arguing that when species are endangered or threatened, 
each specific population represents critical role in long-term battle for survival, and that by not 
extending jeopardy protection to discrete populations, ESA allows for gradual  
population-by-population meta decline trending towards extinction); Rohlf, supra note 50, at 277 
(elaborating on the benefits of multiple populations, including serving as sources of colonists and 
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Perhaps most importantly, legitimizing risk will justify listing species earlier, 
before they are demonstrably threatened or endangered.138 The benefits of 
protecting species more proactively cannot be overstated. Enhancing conservation 
practices before a species becomes threatened or endangered keeps more 
management options open and reduces costs.139 Even when the ESA succeeds in 
preventing extinction, dwindling populations of species offer reduced  
ecological function.140  
Several scholars point to the already robust backlog in deserving but unlisted 
species as a reality check on the effectiveness of designing criteria to list more 
species.141 Regardless of resource constraints preventing the Services from acting 
entirely proactively, adopting a modified standard of listing determinations will help 
prioritize listing meritorious species whenever the Services eventually do so.142  
C. Insufficient Consideration of Climate Change in Recovery Plans 
Climate change is altering the compositions of biological communities and 
transforming environmental conditions.143 On the aggregate, these environmental 
threats affect multiple populations of species, reducing the recovery chance of 
endangered species and minimizing the effectiveness of traditional ecological 
safeguards such as population migration.144 However, Section 4 recovery plans do 
not adequately recognize or address these threats imposed by climate change, nor 
do they possess sufficient guiding principles enabling adaptation.145 
To adequately address climate change, recovery plans must become more 
flexible and more thorough. Recovery plans become more thorough by anticipating 
and integrating strategies for defending endangered species against climate 
change.146 These strategies require ongoing human involvement such as prescribing 
fire, reconstructing habitat, controlling invasive exotic species, reducing pollution 
and overexploitation, and increasing the size and genetic variability of populations 
through artificial recruitment.147 Other specifically proactive measures include 
 
hedging against environmental stochasticity); see also Doremus, supra note 54, at 188 (identifying 
inadequacies in defining and protecting hybrids and local populations). 
138.  See, e.g., Evans et al., supra note 27, at 6. 
139. Simmons, supra note 22, at 514. 
140. See supra Section I.D on ecologically ineffective populations. 
141. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 26, at 282; Evans et al., supra note 27, at 8.  
142. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 6 (arguing that adopting the discussed Section 3 changes will 
help bring ESA’s listed species into compliance with internationally recognized determinations of listing 
merit like NatureServe or the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
Red List); see also UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 24. 
143. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 12 (examining impacts of changes in temperature and 
precipitation on species population dynamics). 
144. Id. (anticipating the reduced ability of species populations to migrate by  
repopulating themselves). 
145. Id. at 28; Davison et al., supra note 11, at 14. 
146. See, e.g., UCI Law ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 25–27. 
147. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 11. 
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identifying and protecting future suitable habitats, actively helping species move 
beyond their historical ranges, and creating new habitat.148 By virtue of requiring 
additional effort, these methods may join the list of proposals that are necessary, 
expensive, and unrealistic.149 One can only hope that the Services will continue to 
maximize their funding, but in the meantime, these suggestions are useful for two 
reasons. Even in the absence of additional funding, providing and codifying clearer 
directives enables Agencies to internally divert funding to implement these 
strategies. Secondly, codifying thoroughness will incentivize the Services to seek 
partnerships with efficient industries that specialize in implementing risk reducing 
ecological practices.150  
Moreover, flexibility allows recovery plans to react to changed circumstances 
brought on by climate change.151 The framework of adaptive management 
incorporates the benefit of flexibility by offering an iterative approach to 
management whereby objectives evolve as impacted by progress, external change, 
and general scientific uncertainty.152 In light of climate change, this flexibility is 
particularly useful, if not emphatically required.153 In particular, adaptive 
management integrates population ecology, conservation genetics, and habitat 
conservation with considerations of external and climactic risks.154 These integrated 
measures of extinction risk clarify the projections and management responses 
related to habitat loss or restoration, migration, range, abundance, and adaptability, 
and would thereby help the Services integrate ESA Sections 7, 9, and 10 into 
recovery actions.155  
Commentators remain sharply divided on adaptive management.156 An 
overreliance on adaptive management enshrines a rationale whereby potentially 
useful political confrontations and information-creation mechanisms are delayed or 
 
148. Camacho, supra note 114, at 237 (suggesting also introducing species to replace important 
ecological niches or services lost due to global climate change and other stressors); Evans et al., supra 
note 29, at 24. 
149. John Kostyack & Dan Rohlf, Conserving Endangered Species in an Era of Global Warming, 
38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10203, 10206 (2008); Evans et al., supra note 27, at 24; UCI Law 
ESA Roundtable, supra note 8, at 26. 
150. Before attending law school, the Author worked for an ecosystem restoration company 
that contracted with municipal and state governments to perform various facets of  
ecological reconstruction.  
151. Davison et al., supra note 11, at 14; Evans et al., supra note 27, at 28. 
152. Davison et al., supra note 11, at 14. 
153. Evans et al., supra note 27, at 18 (arguing that, in light of limited information and inability 
to predict species’ responses to management, adaptive management is necessary for species 
management because it enables managers to monitor and learn from results). 
154. Id. at 22. 
155. Id. (arguing also that adaptive management allows for wholistic approach to risk analysis 
because recovery criteria can integrate threat mitigation and consider adequacy of other  
regulatory mechanisms). 
156. See, e.g., Camacho, supra note 85, at 329, 340 (identifying failure of Agencies to implement 
adaptive management principles in context of HCPs); Doremus, supra note 36, at 76 (problematizing 
the use of adaptive management in sphere of HCPs and granting incidental take permits; providing 
critiques that may be extrapolated to other ESA sections). 
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entirely bypassed.157 Approving uncertain decisions upon the promise of future 
flexibility fails to use the ESA’s powerful information-generating tool now, at a time 
when informing statutory decisions is critical to understanding and addressing 
impending change and risk.158 More generally, an overreliance on Agency flexibility 
can result in a failure to translate adaptive management principles into practice, 
leaving poorly defined plans to guide continuous management.159 With flexibility at 
the core of its function yet at the mercy of overseeing Agencies, the concept of 
adaptive management is perhaps too optimistic when measured against the political 
realities of Agencies seeking to avoid conflict and the reality of resource shortages. 
Nevertheless, Agency flexibility works both ways. As the extent of environmental 
challenges becomes clearer, potential solutions will become more compelling and 
the public will embrace more responsibility for helping stem the tide of 
environmental degradation. We may soon have Agencies utilizing this flexibility to 
better implement stricter recovery plans to maximize conservation outcomes. 
CONCLUSION 
The Endangered Species Act is full of stifling shortcomings and ambitious 
potential. By examining the Act’s framework of promoting recovery, protecting 
habitat, and managing change, this Note explored how the most effective 
improvements to the ESA are those that offer clear guidance to the Services, 
provide additional flexibility for partnering with private stakeholders, incorporate 
risk, increase implementation of ecosystem-management principles, and  
enable proactivity. 
This Note has begun situating the benefits of these proposals with the realities 
of political cost and resource limitations. Further scholarship would benefit from 
more rigorously assessing the feasibility of proposals based on these challenges. 
Agency discretion160 and the balance of power between Agencies, Congress, and 
the public also merits broader consideration. As the scale of environmental 
challenges continues to grow, the ESA must and will become more versatile, more 
accessible, and more effective to protect and steward our species.  
 
 
 
 
 
157. Doremus, supra note 36, at 70–72.  
158. Id. at 72.  
159. Camacho, supra note 85, at 340 (demonstrating that agencies charged with duty of assessing 
and finetuning adaptive management strategies robbed adaptive management of its benefits by largely 
neglecting its potential for systematic, rigorous evaluation and adaptation); see also Doremus, supra note 
36, at 70–71 (criticizing adaptive management in HCP context for offering initial flexibility to enable 
present action while often failing to provide sufficient flexibility later if initial models floundered).  
160. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 73, at 186, 190; Rohlf, supra note 50, at 276; UCI Law ESA 
Roundtable, supra note 8, at 23. 
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